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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes optimal search and consumption strategies for 
consumers with respect to goods for which � are unknown prior to 
actual consumption of the good. The form of an optimal strategy is 
characterized and certain comparative statics results derived. Of 
particular interest is the possibility that an increase in search 
costs might actually increase pre- initial purchase search. 
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND BELATED INFORMATION: 
THE CASE OF UNCERTAIN TASTES 
Louis L. Wilde 
1 • INTRODUCTION 
The notion that consumer behavior varies systematically across 
markets as a function of the informational characteristics of goods 
has a long history. Melvin Copeland, writing in the Harvard Business 
Review in 1923 , divided goods into three classes, shopping goods, 
convenience goods and specialty goods.1 The first contemporary
economist to exploit the implications of informational differences 
between goods was Nelson (1970) .  Nelson drew a distinction between 
goods for which the consumer can judge the potential stream of utility 
yielded by purchasing and consuming the good prior to actual 
consumption (search goods ) and those goods for which such judgments 
require actual consumption (experience goods ) .  A third class of goods 
was added to these two by Darby and Karni (1973 ) .  They defined a 
credence good as one for which the stream of utility associated with 
purchase and consumption cannot be known with certainty even after the 
good has been consumed. Many "services" such as those provided by 
doctors or mechanics are said to fall in this category. Prescription 
drugs , perhaps , do also. 
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The original papers analyzing the implications of the 
distinction between search, experience and credence goods relied on 
relatively simple models and focused on market structure effects. In 
a later paper, Nelson (1974)  also used his categorization to develop a 
theory of advertising. Somewhat more sophisticated models of consumer 
behavior related to search and experience goods can be found in Wilde 
(1980 , 1981 ) , Hey and McKenna (1981 ) and Lippman and McCall (1981 ) .  
The purpose of this paper is to introduce yet another class of 
goods , to analyze consumer behavior with respect to these goods , and 
thus highlight the importance of distinguishing between them and 
search, experience or credence goods. For want of a letter name, I 
will call the new class innovative goods. The essential feature of an 
innovative good is that the consumer does not know his or her own 
tastes with respect to the good before consuming it. nQuality• (that 
is, unobservable nonprice attributes) may or may not be observable 
before purchase and consumption. Once the good has been consumed, 
quality may still be an issue, but generally there will be no question 
about tastes. Thus innovative goods may have search, experience or 
credence features; i.e., this new class of goods is distinct from 
those identified to date in the economics literature since all presume 
tastes are known, but it is more in the nature of a generalization of 
existing classes than an "intermediate" subset. 
The class of innovative goods is extremely broad and 
important. Consider, for example, motorcycles. Most people don't 
really know if they will like riding motorcycles before they purchase 
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their first one. After doing so, one of two events typically occurs, 
either the consumer is scared witless and sells the motorcycle 
immediately or he or she falls in love with motorcycles and buys a 
bigger one at the first opportunity. Backpacking gear is another 
example. Outdoor equipment stores usually have noteboards covered 
with private ads listing both new and used equipment for sale. The 
new items are typically advertised by people who have discovered they 
hate staggering around the hills in heavy boots with everything they 
need to survive for a week strapped to their back, the used items are 
typically advertised by people who love doing this and desire to 
"upgrade" their gear. Other examples are musical instruments. ski 
gear and, perhaps , the services of psychologists. 
The unique feature of an innovative good is that available 
sources of information about it (e.g. , word of mouth, consumer 
magazines, advertising, or even personal introspection) are inadequate 
to eliminate a consumer's uncertainty about the degree to which he or 
she will want to continue consuming the good after an initial trial. 
To some degree this problem exists for any good which is unfamiliar to 
a consumer. In particular, new products will generally qualify as 
innovative goods since by definition no consumer has ever had any 
experience with them.2 For new products , the source of information
most consumers use for reducing uncertainty about their potential 
preferences for untried products, recommendations by acquaintances 
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with similar tastes to their own on related products, is unavailable. 
The point of this discussion is that innovative goods 
constitute a large and significant class. Furthermore, they come in 
two types; goods which already exist but may be new to individual 
consumers, and goods which are new to all consumers. While the 
analysis of both is of interest to economists because of its 
implications for market structure, advertising, and the like, it 
should also be of interest to marketing specialists since their 
primary concerns include designing strategies for attracting new 
customers, both to existing products and new products. The formal 
model developed in this paper will focus on an individual consumer so 
the distinction between products which are new to all consumers and 
those which are new to an individual consumer will not matter in what 
follows. However, the implications of the model may be sensitive to 
this distinction so it is important to be aware of it. 
The simplest model possible which captures the essence of 
innovative goods is one in which there is no quality variation� 
goods are homogeneous. Thus , as a first step, this paper will 
consider innovative "search" goods. Given a nondegenerate 
distribution of prices, positive search costs, and a discount factor 
strictly less than one, the consumer faces two interconnected 
problems; (1) how much should he or she search prior to buying a good, 
. consuming it and thus discovering his or her true tastes, and (2) once 
tastes are known, should he or she stop consuming the good altogether, 
continue to repurchase the good consumed on the initial trial, or 
search more for a lower price? Once nonprice attributes are 
introduced, there is an additional problem of determining desired 
quality.3
s 
However, as already noted, this paper will ignore the quality 
issue. Section 2 will set up the formal model when goods are 
homogeneous. Section 3 will analyze the model under the assumption 
that the consumer's tastes are such that he or she will never desire 
to stop consuming the good altogether once his or her tastes are 
known. This simple case illustrates well the striking difference 
between innovative goods and existing categorizations of goods based 
on their informational properties. When the consumer's uncertain 
tastes are such that he or she will always want to continue consuming 
the good once those tastes are known, it will be shown that the 
optimal search and consumption strategy is based on a scalar, p*, and 
a function, r(x ) ,  where x is a measure of tastes, such that the 
consumer will search prior to observing the true value of the taste 
parameter until a price less than or equal to p* is observed. Once 
such a price is found, the good will be purchased at that price, 
consumed, and the true value of x observed. At this point the 
consumer will renew search if x turns out to be less than or equal to 
r(x ) ,  seeking only a lower price since goods are homogeneous. 
Otherwise he or she will continue to purchase the initially consumed 
good. While it will always be the case that r(x ) increases when 
search costs increase, the striking result derived in Section 3 is 
that the sign of dp*/dc is ambiguous. In other words, an increase in 
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search costs will always make the consumer less likely to renew search 
(and less likely to hold out for a low price if search is renewed) 
once tastes are known, but one cannot rule out the possibility of � 
search prior to the initial purchase of the good. This is an 
unintuitive result, and one which never occurs for search/experience 
goods (Wilde, 1980 , Section 4 ) .  In fact , it appears that no other 
existing search model yields such a possibility. 
Section 4 will add the possibility that the consumer may wish 
to cease consuming the good once his or her tastes are known. This 
additional option will not significantly effect the qualitative 
features of the simpler model considered in Section 3. In particular, 
the possibility that an increase in search costs will increase search 
prior to initial purchase will still exist. However, Section 4 does 
show that an increase in the value of the no-consumption option will 
increase p*, implying that pre-initial purchase search falls. In 
other words, the larger is the difference between the expected utility 
of consuming the innovative good and not consuming it, the more 
intense is price search. 
Section S will conclude the paper by discussing the
implications of the analysis and the effects of modifying various 
assumptions. It will also outline a strategy for future research. 
. 2. THE GENERAL MODEL FOR INNOVATIVE SEARCH GOODS. 
The formal model of optimal consumer behavior with respect to 
innovative goods developed in this section is structurally similar to 
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the analysis of search/experience goods developed in Wilde (1980) . 
Suppose initially that goods last for one period. Ultimately one 
would like to allow for variable durability in order to investigate 
the sensitivity of the consumer's optimal strategy to increases in the 
lifetime of the good (Wilde, 1980, Section 5), but a one-period model
simplifies the analysis since there is no issue of disposal value in 
cases where the consumer desires not to continue consumption once 
tastes are known.4 Let the distribution of prices be F(p) where
f(p) = F'(p) is the density function associated with F. 
Assumption 1: f(p ) ) 0 for all p 2 O. 
Assumption 1 is made without loss of generality. Undoubtedly prices 
are bounded below 0 and cannot be arbitrarily large, but assuming such 
only introduces excess notation and specious realism. 
Regarding preferences, let the consumer have an indirect 
utility function over price which is parameterized by some taste 
parameter x. That is, preferences are summarized by V(p;x) where the 
following holds. 
Assumption 2: For all p 2 0 and all x:
av/ap = v < o, p ( i) 
(ii) av/ax = vx > o, 
Ciii) a2v/apax = v = v • a2v/axap > o. px xp 
Indirect utility is decreasing in price and increasing in the taste 
parameter. The crucial, and strongest assumption is that the cross 
partial of the indirect utility function with respect to these two 
variables is positive. This means that a higher value of the taste 
parameter decreases the marginal disutility of paying higher prices. 
In other words , the taste parameter, in some sense, measures the 
intensity of the consumer's preference for the good� the more the 
consumer prefers the good, the less he or she is concerned with 
marginal increases in the price of the good (for any given price) .  
The implications of assuming this cross partial is negative will be 
discussed in Section 5. 
Let the distribution of the taste parameter be G(x ) where 
g(x ) G'(x ) is its associated density function. 
Assumption 3: g (x ) > 0 for all x e 1R. 
Assumption 3 can easily be relaxed. Again, like Assumption 1 ,  it is 
made primarily for analytical and notational convenience. 
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Assumption 4: The cost of observing prices is a constant, c, measured 
in the same units as V, where c l O. Price observations are
independent draws from F. 
Assumption 5: Search activity is timeless. The discount rate on
consumption is p, where 0 < P < 1.  The horizen is infinite.
Assumption 4 is standard. Assumption 5 is strong but important for
conceptual reasons as well as analytical tractability. There are two 
kinds of costs associated with consuming a good when tastes are 
uncertain; the first is the opportunity cost of consuming a good when 
tastes are potentially of low intensity, thus foregoing alternative 
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uses of income. The second is the postponement of the latter into the 
future (in this model, one period) .  Search is herein assumed to be 
timeless � as many observations of price as the consumer desires can 
be obtained (at cost c per observation) at the beginning of any period 
(see footnote 4 and text supra; Wilde, 1980 , p. 1 267) � in order to 
avoid confounding these two effects. As a formal matter, this 
assumption could easily be relaxed.5
Assumption 6: The utility to the consumer of not consuming the good 
at all is U per period. 
If the expected discounted utility of an optimal search and 
consumption strategy is less than U/(l - � ) ,  the consumer will never 
buy the good at all. If the good is purchased, the consumer will 
subsequently compare, once his or her tastes are known, the discounted 
utility of repurchasing the good at the original price forever with 
the expected discounted utility of renewing search or the utility of 
discontinuing consumption (the latter yielding U per period) .  Let the 
expected discounted utility of an optimal search strategy once tastes 
are known be denoted W(x ) .  Let the expected discounted utility of an 
optimal search and consumption strategy, prior to observing tastes , 
given a current observation of price p be denoted z(p ) , and let the 
expected value of z(p) with respect to the price distribution F be 
denoted Z. Then 
z(p ) - c + max{Z,B(p ) }, (1 ) 
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where B(p ) is the expected discounted utility of buying the good at 
price p and proceeding optimally thereafter.6 Under Assumptions 1-6 ,
B(p ) is defined by 
B(p) Jm V(p;x)dG(x ) + �E�ax{U/(l - � ) . W(x ) , V(p;x ) /{l - � ) }. (2)
-m 
The logic of (2) is as follows. The cost of observing p is c 
(measured in "utils") .  If the consumer buys the good at price p, the 
expected value of V(p,x) with respect to x is received in the current 
period (recall search is assumed to be timeless ) .  At the beginning of 
the next period the consumer has three options; cease consumption and 
receive U/(l - � ) . renew search and receive W(x ) , or repurchase the 
good at price p forever and receive V(p;x) /(l - � ) .  The latter two 
options are evaluated as expectations over x, however, at least as 
viewed before any consumption has taken place, since tastes are not 
known ex ante. 7
Equations (1) and (2) define the basic functional equation for 
consumer behavior with respect to innovative goods. This functional 
equation is structurally similar to the one associated with a 
generalized search/experience goods model (see Wilde, 1980 , equations 
(3) and (8) , pages 1269-70) , but, as will become evident below, it has 
quite different properties. 
1 1  
3 .  THE MODEL WHFN CONTINUED CONSUMPl'ION IS CERTAIN; W(x ) 2. U/Cl - Jn
FOR ALL x 
This section analyzes the model developed in Section 2 when 
the consumer's utility function is such that consumption of the good 
ultimately is never an issue; i.e., under the following assumption. 
Assumption 7: W(x) 2. U/(1 - Pl for all x. 
Assumption 7 rules out the option of no repurchase after observing the 
taste parameter � all values of x yield an expected discounted 
utility of renewed search which exceeds the utility of not consuming 
the good at all. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4 .  For 
now, however, it implies that once tastes are known the consumer's 
decision reduces to comparing W(x) to V(p;x) /(1 - p ) , where p is the 
price paid for the initially purchased good.8
3a: The Search-Again Versus Repurchase Decision 
Suppose the consumer has made an initial purchase at price p 
and observed a taste parameter of x. Define 
R(p) fxlVCp;xl /Cl - Pl 2. W(x ) }  
and 
S(p) fxlV(p;x) /(1 - P> < W(x) }  •9 
The set R(p) gives all values of x for which repurchase is optimal 
given p; S(p ) gives all values of x for which renewed search is 
optimal given p. Clearly these sets are disjoint and exhaust all 
(3) 
( 4) 
possible values of x. Using these definitions (and Assumption 7) , 
equation (2) can be written as 
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B(p ) = s= V(p;x )dG(x ) + PfJ [V(p;x) /Cl - p ) ]dG(x ) + J W(x)dG(x ) }. 
-co R(p) S(p) 
In order to analyze the basic functional equation (1) , using 
(5) instead of (2) , it is first necessary to characterize R(p) and 
S(p ) .  With this in mind, consider W(x ) .  
Let W(p;x) be the expected discounted utility of an optimal 
search strategy when the taste parameter is known to be x, given a 
current price observation of p. Then 
W(p;x) = -c + max{W(x) , V(p;x) /(1 - p ) }. (6) 
Once again, (6) incorporates the notion that search is timeless.10
By definition, W(x ) is the expected discounted utility of an 
optimal search strategy once tastes are known to be x. Hence, 
W(x) = s=W(p;x) d.F(p) .  
0 
But , following the logic of the basic search model for homogeneous 
goods , one can define r(x ) via 
W(x) = V[r(x ) ;x]/(1 - Pl. 
Since W(x) is independent of p and V < 0, the definition of r(x ) p 
given in (8) implies 
(7) 
( 8) 
(5) 
W(p ; x) 
{-' + [V(p;xl/(1 - Pll
-c + W(x) 
if p � r(x) 
if p > r(x) .11
Taking the expectation of (6 ) with respect to F, using (9) ,  gives 
r(x) m 
W(x) = -c + f [V(p; x) / ( l  - p)]dF(p) + J W(x)dF (p ) .  0 r(x)  
Equations (8) and (10) together imply r(x) is defined by 
r(x) 
c (l - P> = J {V(p ;x) - V[r(x) ; x]}dF (p ) .  
0 
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(9) 
( 10) 
( 11) 
Equation (11) is the standard rul e for defining a reservation price 
when indirect util ity is nonlinear in price, search is timel ess, and 
the future utility of consumpt ion is  discounted at rate p over an 
infinite horizen. 
Lemma 1 :  Assumptions 1-7 imply that the unique optimal ex post search 
strategy is characterized by a reservation price,  r(x) , such that 
W(p,x) is given by (9) ,  where r(x)  is defined by ( 11) . Moreover, 
dr(x) /dx > 0 and r(x)  > 0 iff c > 0 and x is finite, and r(x)  = 0 iff
c = 0. 
Proof: That r(x)  is uniquely defined by ( 11) is trivial, (9) holds by 
def inition, and differentiat ing (11) totally with respect to r and x 
gives 
r(x) r(x) 
0 = J {V (p;x) - V [r( x) ; x]}dF(p) • dx - J V [r(x) ; x]dF(p) • dr. 
0 x x 0 p 
Hence 
r(x) r(x) dr(x) 
= 
f {V (p ;x) - V [r( x) ; x]}dF(p) /J V [r(x) ;x]dF(p) .dx 0 x x o P 
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( 12) 
Assumption 2 impl ies Vx (p;x) - Vx[r(x) ; x] < 0 for p < r(x) < m and
Vp[r(x) ; x] < O. Cl early, ( 11) impl ies r(x)  > 0 iff c > 0 and r(x)  = 0
iff c = O. Hence dr(x) /dx > 0 iff c > O. Q.E.D. 
Cl early the crucial assumption in Lemma 1 is V > 0. Ifxp 
V < O then dr(x) /dx < 0 for c > O. The model has been developedxp 
assuming Vxp > 0 since this impl ies that an increase in the intensity
of tastes (as measured by x) is associated with a higher reservation 
price;  i.e., the consumer is willing to pay higher prices for the good 
when the taste parameter increases ,  a result which accords nicely with 
the interpretation of x as a measure of the "intens ity" of 
preferences. Figure 1 illustrates r(x)  as a function of x. 
In order to characterize R(p) and S(p) , def ine h( x;p) as  
h(x;p) [V(p;x)/( l - p)] - W(x ).  ( 13) 
Then (3) and (4) become 
R(p) {xlh(x;p) 2. O} (14) 
and 
S(p) {xlh(x;p) < 0}. ( 15 )  
From (8) ,  however, ( 13) can be written as 
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h(x;p) {V(p;x) - V[r(x) ,x]J/ C l  - � ) .  (16) 
The repurchase and search sets, R(p) and S(p) respectively, wil l have 
a structure which depends on the "zeros" of h. To analyze these 
points it is ne cessary to establish properties of h, a process which 
requires the following assumption and lemma. 
Assumption 8: lim V (p, x) > 0 for all p 2. O. 
x °""' xp 
Lemma 2: Given Assumptions 1-5 and 8 ,  
( i) r-1 (p)  exist s  for all p > p ,
( ii) dr-1 (p) /dp > 0 for al l p > p, 
( iii) ah(x,p) /ap < O for all x and p > p.
where p is given by p = lim r(x) .
x °""' 
Proof: Suppose r(x)  is finite as x°""'· Then from (12) , 
r( m) 
lim dr(x) = 0 if and only if f {V (p, m)  - V [r(m)  ,m]} dF (p) = 0, 
X°""' dx Q X X 
where r(m) = lim r(x) is finite and Vx ( l , m )  = lim Vx ( l ,x) for any x °""' x ""'"' 
q 2. O. Since r(x)  is finite, however, this means
1. .!!till = O if and only if lim V (p, x) = 0 ,im dx --"m xp X"""' X� 
a contradiction to Assumption 8 .  Hence since dr(x) /dx > 0 for al l 
x < "'• 
lim r(x) = "'• 
X"""' 
1 6  
Thus r-1 Cp)  exist s for all p > p, dr-1 ( p ) /�p > 0 since dr(x )/d (x) > 0 ,
and ah(x,p) /ap < O for all x and a l l  p > p from
( 16) . Q.E.D. 
Assumption 8 is really a technical convenience. If it does  
not hold, r (x )  may converge to  some finite value , say ;(x) , a s  x goe s 
to infinity. In this case r-1(p)  is only well-defined for
p < p < r(x) and one must constantly allow for this in the formal
analysis of the optimal search and consumption strategy. No analogue 
to Assumption 8 can eliminate this problem for low prices however 
unless c = 0 ,  in which case r(x)  = 0 for all x. To ease the 
notational burden, it is therefore useful to define 
r-1 (p)  = -m for P � P• 
Theorem 1:  Given Assumptions 1-5 and 8 ,  
S(p) = (-m , r-l(p )] ,
where r (x )  i s  uniquely def ined for all x by ( 11) . 
Proof: It is cl ear from ( 16) that x r-1 (p)  solves h( x;p) = 0 when
r-l(p)  exist s. This i s  the case for p > p ( se e  Figure 1) . If pi p ,
then r-1 (p)  = -m so S(p)  i s  empty in this case . Furthermore,  if
p > p. 
ah(x,p)/h {Vx(p, x) - Vp[r(x) ,x](dr(x) /dx] - Vx[r(x) , x]J/(1  - � ) .
But from ( 12) , 
( 17)  
r(x) 
dr(x) /dx = f {V ( q, x) - V [r(x) ,x]}d.F( q) /V [r(x) ,x]F [r(x)],  
0 x x p 
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where q is an arbitr ary variable of integration. Hence (17) becomes 
1 r(x)ah(x ,p) /ax = {V (p, x) - F[r(x)]- f [V ( q; x) - V ( r(x)  ,x)]d.F( q)x 0 x x 
Hence 
- Vx[r(x),x]}/(1  - p)
r(x) 
= f [V (p; x) - V ( q, x) ]d.F(q)/C l  - p)F[r(x )] .  
0 x x 
( 18) 
p 
ah[r-l(p ) ,p]/ax = f {V [p, r-l(p )]  - V [q, r-l( p ) ]}d.F( q) /( 1  - p)F(p) .
0 x x 
Equation (19) is positive since V > O. Thus each h(x,p) curve cutsxp 
the x axis at x = r-l(p)  with positive slope. Furthermore,  every x
has such a curve passing through it.  Since ah(x,p)/ap < 0 no point 
can have more than one curve passing through it, so x = r-1 (p)  must be
a unique solution to h(x,p) = O. Q. E.D. 
Remark 1: Theorem 1 should come as no surprise. Once the consumer 
has purchased a good at price p and consumed it, the tast e parameter 
is known and the current price observation is p. At this point the 
consumer is in a standard sequential search environment. The known 
price p is compared to the reservation price r (x).  If  it  exceeds r (x)  
search is initiated, otherwise the good priced at  p is  repurchased. 
( 19) 
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But p 2 r(x) is equivalent to r-1 Cp)  2 x. Hence S(p) [-.. , r-l(p )]  • 
3b. The Initial Purchase Decision 
Given Theorem 1 ,  B(p) can be written, from ( 5) , as 
B(p)  = f00 V(p;x) dG(x)
r-l(p) ., +Pf W( x)dG(x) +Pf [V(p;x) /(1 - p)]dG(x) .  
_., 
r-l(p)
_., 
Using (20) in (1) , it is now possible to analyze the consumer's 
behavior prior to purchasing and consuming a good; i. e . ,  before the 
taste parameter is known. 
Lemma 3 :  Under Assumpt ions 1 -8, dB(p) /dp < 0 for all p 2 O. 
Proof: From ( 20) , 
B·c > f.. -1 -1 I -1 P = V (p, x) dG(x) + pg[r (p) ][dr (p )  dp]{W[r (p )]�p 
- [V(p, r-l(p ) ) /(1  - p )]} + [p/(1 - p )]  f00 V (p , x)dG(x) . 
-1 
p 
r (p)  
But (8) implies 
W[r-1 (p )]  = V[p, r-1 (p) ]/(1  - p) ,
so the se cond term in (21)  is z ero. Hence 
B'(p) = f00 V (p , x)dG(x) + [p/ Cl  - p)]  f00 V (p, x)dG(x ) .  
_., p -1 
p 
r (p )  
( 22) 
( 20) 
( 21) 
Clearly (22) is negative since V < O. p Q.E.D.
12
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Since Z equals the expected value of z(p) with respect to F, 
it can be treated as a constant. With B'(p) < 0, this means that the 
equation 
Z = B(p) (23) 
will have a unique solution, p•, unless B(p) > Z for all p L 0 or 
B(p) < Z for all p L O. In the former case define p• = m and in the 
latter case define p• = O. Then 
z(p) 
{-c + B(p)
-c + z 
if p i p• 
(24) 
if p > p•.13 
Hence p• is a "reservation price" for pre-initial purchase search.14 
Summarizing this discussion gives another basic result. 
Theorem 2: Under Assumptions 1-8, there exists a unique price, p•, 
such that z(p) is characterized by (24). Furthermore, p• is defined 
by 
p• 
c = J [B(p) - B(p*)]dF(p), 
0 
which implies p• > 0 iff c > 0 and p• 0 iff c 
(25) 
o. 
Proof: Taking the expectation of z(p) with respect to p, using (24), 
gives 
z
p* m 
-c + J B(p)dF(p) + J ZdF(p). 
0 p• 
(26) 
20 
But Z = B(p•) by definition of p•. Hence (26) can be written as (25).
Given Assumption 6, p• = 0 iff c = 0 and p• > 0 iff c > O. Q.E.D. 
Remark 2: The consumer's optimal search and consumption strategy with 
respect to innovative goods is fully characterized by p• and r(x). 
Issues related to the existence of solutions to the two functional 
equations, (1) and (6), have been sidestepped by using constructive 
techniques. More general approaches to the existence problem in 
search models are well-known so will not be discussed in this paper. 
3c. The Effects of Increased Search Costs 
The optimal search and consumption strategy for innovative 
goods when W(x) L U/(l - P> for all x has rough similarities to that 
for search/experience goods. The striking difference between these 
models becomes obvious, however, when one considers the effects of 
increases in search costs. 
Theorem 3: Given Assumptions 1-5 , dr(x)/dc > O. Given Assumptions 
1-8, dp*/dc is ambiguous. In particular, 
M.! = de 
• r-l(p*) 
[B'(p*)F(p•)]-1{p � J F[r(x)]-ldG(x)dF(p) 
0 
r-l(p) 
A A A 
- l}. 
However, there exists p, where 0 < p i 1, such that P < P implies 
dp*/dc > 0 if c > O. Moreover, if c = 0 ,  dp*/dc = O. 
Proof: Totally differentiating (25) gives 
• p• .fil!..:. = [B' (p*)F(p*) 1-1£J [ !filJ!.l. - .filll.£!l ]dF( ) - l} de 0 ac ac p • 
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(27)  
Lemma 3 asserts that B'(p*) = aB(p*) /ap < O. Hence the sign of dp*/dc 
depends on the bracketed term in (27) . However, differentiating (20) 
gives 
� = p{W[r-l( p ) ]  - [V(p;r-1 ( p ) ) / (l  - p) ]}[dr-1 (p) /dp ]g[r-1 (p )]ac 
r-l(p )+Pf [aW(x )/ac]dG(x) , 0 
As in Lemma 3 ,  ( 8) impl ies the term in brackets in (28) is zero. 
Hence 
r-l(p)�=Pf [aW(x )/ac ]dG(x).  ac _., 
Differentiating (8) next gives 
aw(x) = v [r(x) ,x][dr(x )/dc]/ (l  - p ) .ac p 
Finally,  totally differentiating ( 11) and rearranging terms gives 
(28) 
( 29) 
(30) 
dr(x) = -( 1  - p ) /F[r (x)]V [r(x) ,x]. ( 3l) de p 
Subst ituting (31) into (30) gives 
-1 aW(x) = -F[r(x) ] • ac 
which impl ies (29) can be written as 
( 32) 
Si.mil arly, 
r-l(p)  -1 !filJ!.l. =-Pf F[r(x)]  dG (x) .ac 
--
r-l(p*)
-1 !!llR.!l =-pf F[r(x) ] dG(x ).  ac 
_., 
The only difference between (33) and (34) is the upper l imit of 
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( 33) 
( 34) 
integration. But the range of integration in (27 ) is [O ,p*] . Hence 
in (33) , pip* and r-l(p)  i r-1 Cp• ) , where the strict inequal ity
holds for p < p*. Thus if c > 0, 
r-l(p*)  � _ !!llR.!l = pf F[r(x )]-1dG(x) > O .ac ac 
-1 r (p )
( 35)  
Subst ituting (33) in (27)  gives the expression for dp*/dc stated in 
the theorem. It is cl ear from ( 31) that dr(x )/dc > O .  Furthermore,
B'(p*) < 0 by Lemma 3 .  Thus the sign of  dp*/dc depends ( in reverse
fashion) on the sign of 
p* r-l(p*)  Pf J F[r(x )]-1dG(x)dF (p)  - 1 .0 r-l(p)
( 36) 
The first term in (36) is positive since r-1 (p*) 2 r-1 (p)  for p s p*
·(with strict inequal ity if p < p*) and p* > 0 whenever c > 0 by
Theorem 2.  Moreover, F[r (x )]-l > 1 for al l x since r(x)  > 0 for all x
when c > 0 by Lemma 1.  Thus it is quite possible for ( 36) to be
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positive, in which case dp*/dc is  negative. Cl early, though, if P is 
A 
small enough, less than P .  say, ( 36) will necessarily be negative and 
A 
dp*/dc > O. Of course , P = 1 is al so a po ssibil ity. When c = 0, 
p• = 0, though, as does  r (x) . Hence dp*/dc = 0 in this
case. Q.E.D. 
Remark 3:  Theorem 3 yields the somewhat counterintuitive result that 
p• might be decreasing in c even though, as usual,  r(x) is always 
increasing in c. If p* is decreasing in c this means the consumer 
searches more when se arch costs rise ( in terms of the expected number 
of observations needed to  find an acceptable price prior to initial 
purchase of the good) . This  is most l ikely when p* is high and r(x)  
is l ow; that is,  when the consumer engages in rel atively l ittle search 
prior to an initial purchase of the good and expects a relatively high 
percentage of possible values of the taste parameter to be such that 
renewing search once the good has been consumed wil l  be opt imal. In 
this case the consumer is spending relatively littl e on search prior 
to initial purchase of the good but often finds more search to be 
desirabl e l ater. But an increase in se arch costs effects the consumer 
both before the initial purchase and after. In the situation j ust 
described, the costs  associated with the latter increase so much when 
search cost s rise that the consumer chooses to search � intensely 
prior to the initial purchase , presumabl y in the hope of finding a 
lower price and thus reducing the l ikelihood of having to bear the 
increased search costs  associated with renewing se arch once tastes are 
known. Effects on post-initial purchase se arch costs,  of course , 
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matter l ess as p falls. For P small enough ( that is, when the future
matters relatively little)  they wil l be dominated by the direct , pre-
purchase effects and p• will rise as c rises. 
Remark 4 :  Another way of  seeing how raising p•  in  response to an 
increase in c might be desirable is il lustrated in Figure 2 .  Let p• 
be the original pre-initial purchase reservation price and r (x) the 
original post-initial purchase reservation price function. Suppose c 
A 
increases. Let r(x)  be the new post-initial purchase reservation 
A 
price function. Necessarily,  r(x) is everwhere greater than r (x ).  
Before the increase in  c ,  taste parameters l ess than or  equal to  
r-1 (p*) would induce renewed search. If  p* remained constant when c
A..1 rose , onl y values of x l ess than or equal to r (p*)  would induce such
behavior. Since �(x)  > r(x) for all x, �1(p )  < r-1 (p) . This means
l ess post-initial purchase search would be expected. But this impl ies 
the consumer is more l ikely to repurchse the good forever at the 
initial purchase price. Hence more search prior to the initial 
purchase may be desirabl e as it wil l  increase the chance of finding a 
lower price , thus avoiding the increased search cost associated with 
renewing search. 
Remark 5: When dp*/dc < 0, the counter-intuitive case , the consumer
expe ct s to sampl e more firms prior to making an initial purchase , but 
dr-l (p*) /dc < 0 in this case as well so that l ess post-initial
purchase search is al so expected, both because fewer values of x will 
induce renewed search and because lower initial purchase prices are to 
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be expected. This can be seen in Figure 2 where an increase in r(x) 
to �(x)  and a decrease in p* to ;. necessaril y impl ies that �1 (�*) is
l ess than r-1 (p*) . The situation is l ess clear when dp*/dc > O. 
Figures 3a and 3b il lustrate two possibil ities. In Figure 3a, p* 
rises more slowly than r(x) as c increase s so that r-1 (p*) falls.
Thus fewer price observations are expected prior to the initial 
purchase , search is l ess l ikely to be renewed once tastes are known, 
and will involve fewer expected observations before an ultimatly 
acceptabl e price if found � all this even though the initial purchase 
price is on average higher. In Figure 3b , p* rises faster than r(x) 
as c increases so that r-1 (p*) rise s. In this case both p* and r (x)
increase with increases in c ,  but the consumer expects to renew search 
more often once tastes are known, even though it is more costly and 
will  involve fewer expected observations before an ul timately 
acceptable price is found � on average ,  the expected amount of post-
initial purchase search, viewed at the start of the process ( i. e. ,  
before any consumption has taken place ) , might well increase as search 
cost s rise. Thus when dp*/dc < 0, there is an unambiguous shift from
post- initial purchase se arch to pre-initial purchase search. When 
dp */dc > 0, the rel ative investment in pre- versus post-initial
purchase search is ambiguous. 
To summarize Remarks 3, 4 , and 5 ,  three  situations are 
possible, illustrated in Figures 2 ,  3a, and 3b. In the first an 
increase in search cost s shifts search away from post-initial purchase 
toward pre-initial purchase ; in the second se arch is reduced for both, 
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the rel ative effect being ambiguous; and in the third search is 
shifted from pre-initial purchase to post- initial purchase. 
3d. An Example 
As might be expected, constructing examples for this problem 
is tedious. I have not yet found one for which dp*/dc < O. However,
consider the following: 
Then 
and 
Hence 
V(p ,x) = x - (m log p) /x,  
f(p) 
g (x) 
r( x) 
W(x) 
p* 
l/m for p e [0,m] ,  
2 2x/n for x e [0,n] and n > p.
xc ( l  - M 
[1/(1 - p ) ][x - C m  log xc ( l  - P>>/x]. 
cn2 ( 1  - p ) /2 (n - p), 
so that dr(x) /dc > 0 and dp*/dc > O. 
4 .  THE MODEL WHEN NO CONSUMPTION IS AN OPTION 
Much of the analysis needed to characterize the consumer's 
optimal search and consumption strategy when he or she has the opt ion 
of not consuming the good at all once tastes are known has already 
been done . The comparison between W(x)  and V (p ,x )/ (1  - p) in this
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case is identical to Section 3, the only  new el ement is that when no 
consumption is an option, obtaining U/( 1  - p) might dominate both of 
these values .  
More specifically,  when Assumpt ion 6 i s  dropped the functional 
equation for the model is again given by (1 )  and (2) . Although W(x)  
and V (p, x ) /(1  - p) are the same as in Sect ion 3 ,  it will  now be
necessary to consider them separately rather than focusing on their 
differenc e ;  i . e . ,  h(x , p) must be decomposed. 
Lemma 4: Assumpt ions 2 and 5 impl y V(p, x )/ (1  - p) is monotonically
increasing in x .  In addition, Assumption 1 -6 and 8 imply i t  has a 
unique intersection with W(x)  at x = r-1 (p)  such that
W(x)  � V(p ; x) /C l - P> as < -1 x y r (p) .
Proof: This resul t follows directly from Assumption 2 and the proof 
of Theorem 1 .  Q. E.D.  
The relationship between V (x ,p )/ (1  - p) and W(x)  is
illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 4 al so suggest s the importance of the 
l evel of expected utility achieved at r-1 (p) . Denote this value by
u(p ) ;  i . e . , set 
W[r-1 (p)]  = u(p) = V[p,r-1 (p) l/Cl - p). (37) 
If U/(1  - p) 2. u(p) , W( x) is irrel evant - it wil l  always be the case
that max{U/(1 - p), V(p , x) /(1  - p)} 2. W(x) . On the other hand, if
U/( 1  - p) < u (p) , then all three post-initial purchase options are
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possibl e, depending on the observed value of the taste parameter. Of 
course, whether W(x)  matters will  depend on the initial purchase price 
since V( p , x) /(1  p), and hence u(p) , depends on p.  But 
V(p, x) /(1  - p) is decreasing in p and r-1 (p)  is increasing in p (see
Lemma 2)  so that u(p) is increasing in p.  This fact yields the 
following Lemma, which can be stated without proof . 
Lemma 5: Assumptions 1 -6 and 8 imply there exists a unique price, pc'
such that 
u(pc ) U/C l  - P>.
Furthermore, 
u(p) � U/C l  - p) as > p '{ Pc·
Lemma 5 establ ishes the existence of a unique price , pc' such
that an initial purchase price l ess than or equal to pc impl ies
renewing search after observing x wil l  never be opt imal . If the 
initial purchase price exceeds pc' then low values of x wil l  imply
that no further consumption is opt imal , intermediate values of x wil l  
imply that renewing search i s  opt imal , an d  high values of x wil l  imply 
that consuming the initially purchased good forever is optimal . 
B(p) 
More formally, Lemma 5 impl ies that if p > pc' then
Jm V(p ,x )dG(x )  + PExmax{U/C l  - p) ,V(p, x) /(1  - p) ,W(x ) } ,  (3g) -00 
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and if p i pc' then
B(p)  = fm V(p, x)dG(x) + PExmax{U/( 1  - p) ,V(p,x)/(1  - P) } . (39) 
_.., 
4a. The Case in which p > Pc· 
Consider first (38). By definition, u(p ) = U/C l  - p ) .  But c 
(37)  impl ies 
W[r-1 (p  )] = U/(1  - p ) .c (40) 
In other words , W(x) always intersects the U/( 1  - p) line at r-1 (p ) .c 
This makes sense since neither W(x) nor U/(1  - p) depends on p. If 
P = Pc' then V (p , x) /( 1  - P> passes through this same point with slope
greater than W'[r-1(p  ) ]. If p > p ,  then V(p , x) /(1  - P> cuts W(x) toc c 
the right of this point (see  Lemma 4) and if p < p then V (p ,x )/U - p)c 
cuts W(x) to the l eft of this point. Thus if x < r-1 Cp  ) ,  U/(1  - p)c 
dominates in (38), if r-1 (p ) ix i r-1 (p) , W(x) dominates in (38), c 
and if x > r-1 (p) , V(p , x) /(1  - p) dominates in (38). This is
il lustrated in Figure 5 and summarized in  the following l emma. 
Lemma 6. Under Assumpt ions 1-6 and 8, there exists a function, r(x) , 
defined by ( 11) , and a unique price,  pc' defined in Lemma 5, such that
for p > pc'
{u/<1-M 
max{U/( l-p) ,V(p , x) /(1-p) ,W(x)} = W(x) 
V(p , x) /(1-p) 
-1 if x < r (pc )
-1 -1 if r (pc ) � x � r (p)
if  r-1 (p)  < x.
(41)  
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In this case (p >pc ) ,
B(p) = fm V(p, x) dG(x) + P 
-1 r ( pc>f [U/(1  - p) ]dG(x) 
_.., -m 
m fr-l(p)
+ p W(x)dG(x) + P
f 
[V( p , x) /(1  - p) ]dG(x ).  (42) 
r-l(p)-1 r (pc )
4b. The Case in which p i Pc ·
Consider next (39) • In this case W(x) is irrelevant and the 
optimal pol icy reduce s  to comparing U/( 1  - p) to V (p,x)/(1  - p) , or 
since 0 < P < 1 ,  to comparing U to V(p, x) . This i s  a simpl e exercise 
which yields the analogue to Lemma 6. 
Lemma 7: Under Assumpt ions 1-6 and 8, there exist s a funct ion, a(p) , 
such that for p i Pc•
max{U/( 1  - p ) ,V (p,x)/(1  - p)} 
In thi s  case (pi Pc) '
{u/C l  - P> 
V(p , x) / ( 1  - p) 
m a(p)  
B(p) = f V(p, x)dG(x) + Pf [U/ C l  - p) ]dG(x) 
-m _.., 
if x < a(p) 
if x2a(p).  
+ Pfm [V( p , x) /( 1  - p) ]dG(x) . 
a(p) 
Proof: The critical value of x is given by 
(43) 
(44) 
V[p,cr(p)]  u. 
Since VP < 0 and Vx > 0, cr(p)  is well-def ined. Furthermore, Vx > 0 
also impl ies that U > V(p,x) for x < cr(p)  and U < V(p,x) for 
x > cr(p ) .  Q.E.D. 
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( 45 )  
Remark 6: As p -7 pc' equations (42) and (44) yield the same value
for B(p ) .  Hence B(p) is continuous for al l p 2 O. Moreover, it will
be shown below that it is al so differentiable at  p = Pc · The l atter
is merely a curi.osity, whil e the former is crucial since it impl ies 
that p* is st il l defined uniquely by Z = B(p* ) .  
4c. Optimal Preinitial-Purchase Search. 
Lemmas 6 and 7, and Remark 6 characterize B(p) fully. The 
fact that it is continuous means that the form of optimal pre-initial 
purchase search can be analyzed us ing the same technique s as those 
employed in Section 3. Initially, the logic used to prove Lemma 3 
( essentially an envelope-type theorem) , yields the following. 
Lemma 8: Under Assumptions 1-6 and 8, for p S. Pc•
B'(p) = s= v (p,x)dG(x) +Pf= [V (p,x)/(1 - p )]dG(x) ,
-<D p cr(p) p 
and for p > pc'
B'(p) = s= V (p,x)dG(x) + p s= [V (p,x) /(1 - p )]dG(x) . -= 
p -1 p r (p)  
(46) 
( 47)  
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Hence B'(p)  < 0 for all p 2 O. Furthermore, B(p) is differentiable at
p = Pc·
Proof: Equations (46) and (47)  fol low directly from ( 44) and (42) , 
respe ctively. That B(p) is differentiable at pc follows from noting
-1 ( that cr(pc) = r Pc) .  Q.E.D. 
Given Lemma 8, the analogue to Theorem 2 is immediate. 
Theorem 4: Under Assumptions 1-6 and 8, there exist s a unique price, 
p*, such that 
z(p)  = -c + max{Z,B(p ) }  
{ -c + B(p) 
-c + z 
if p s. p* 
( 48) 
if p > p*, 
where Z Epz(p) , B(p) is given in (42) and ( 44) , and p* is  def ined by 
c = .'-'*[B(p)  - B(p* ) ]dF(p).
0 
Furthermore, p* > 0 iff c > 0 and p* = 0 iff c = O. 
( 49) 
As should be evident by now, the addition of a no-repurchase 
option does  little to effect the qualitative  features of the model, at 
l east from a formal point of view. In its absence the consumer must 
decide between renewing se arch and repurchasing the initially 
_purchased good once tastes are known. For x low enough ( less than 
r-1 ( p ) )  the latter will  dominate the former. As x increase s two
things happen: first, the expected discounted util ity of an optimal 
ex post search strategy increase s (renewed search is more attractive 
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in absolute terms) , but , second, repurchase is st il l even more 
attractive relative to renewed search ( eventually dominating it for x 
large enough) . It i s  the first effect which is crucial to the 
analysis of a no-repurchase.option� it impl ies that the latter 
simply protects the consumer against low outcomes of x. However, if 
p• � Pc• then all acceptable initial purchase prices will  yield post-
initial purchase situations in which the need to renew search is 
eliminated altogether by the no-repurchase option. If p• > pc' then
for some acceptable initial purchase prices (those between pc and p• ) ,
the need t o  renew search once tastes are known i s  a possibil ity ( i.e., 
for x between r-1 (p ) and r-1 (p) ) .  c 
Remark 7 :  One basic issue in models  of belated information concerns 
the trade-off between investment s in information acquisition before 
and after initial consumption takes pl ace. In the context of 
innovative goods, it is important to understand how the presence of a 
no-repurchase option effects this trade-off.15 It would appear from
the above discussion that it mitigates more against post-initial 
purchase search that pre-initial purchase search, but a def inite 
judgment in this matter must await the comparative statics derived 
next. 
4d. The Effects of Increases in c and U. 
Consider first the effect s of increases in c .  This analysis 
follows much like that in Section 3c. In particul ar, similar 
arguments yield the following result. 
Theorem 5 :  Given Assumptions 1-5, dr(x) /dc > O. Furthermore,
Assumptions 1-6 and 8 imply that if p* � pc then
� = -[B'(p*)F(p*)]-1 > 0,
de 
but if p* > pc' however, dp•/dc is ambiguous since in this case
�=de 
• -l(p•)
[B'(p*)F (p• ) ]-l(pj1' � F[r(x)]-ldG(x)dF (p )  
pc r-1(p)
- 1}. 
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( 50) 
( 51 )  
A A A 
Thus, when p• > pc' there exists p, where 0 < P � 1, such that P < P 
impl ies dp*/dc > 0 if c > O. If c = 0, then dp*/dc = O. 
Proof: That dr(x) /dc > 0 is immediate from Section 3 since r(x) is 
independent of U. Moreover, differentiating (40) once again gives the 
general form 
� = [B' (p*)F(p•) r1 { r1'\�.!ti.tl - illl1.!11 dF(p - 1}.de J 0 ac ac 
Now consider aB(p) /ac. When p � p , B(p) is given in (44) and isc 
cl early independent of c. Hence equation (50) holds since 
p• � Pc = impl ies p � Pc · When p• > Pc• there exist s acceptabl e pre­
initial purchase prices such that p > pc. For these,
r-l(p)�= -pf [aW(x )/ac ]dG(x).  ac 
1 r- (pc )
( 52)  
The only difference between (52) and (29)  is  that the no-repurchase 
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option truncates the integral at r-1 Cp ) .  Thus for p* L p) p ,c c 
-1 -l(p• )  
.fil!!.J!l _ !!il.J!.!l = p r F[r(x) J-1G(x)ac ac 
-1 
r (p)  
- P J F[r(x) J-1G(x)
-1 r (pc ) r (pc )
-l(p*) 
P � F[r(x) J-1dG(x) .
r-l(p)
(53) 
For p• > p > p , ( 53) must be positive since r-1 (p )  < r-1 Cp*) on thisc 
range . Hence for p• > pc' dp*/dc has a form identical to that given
in Theorem 3 except that prices are integrated over [pc, p*] in this
case since the integrand is zero for p � p*.  Q.E.D.  
Remark 8:  The introduction of the no-repurchase opt ion has no effect 
on post-initial purchase search, viewed ex post of the real ization of 
the taste parameter. However, it does  effect the qual itative 
relationship between p• and c. In particular, for l ow values of p• 
(less  than pc ) ,  dp*/dc wil l  always be po sitive.  Furthermore, for
higher values of p* (greater than pc) ,  dp*/dc would appear to be
increasing in U; that is, the rol e of U seems to be to increase dp*/dc 
so that increases in search costs will  l ead to relatively less pre-
initial purchase se arch when W(x) < U for some x compared to the
situation in which W(x) L U for al l x. However, this argument is 
incompl ete since it turns out that both p• and, by Lemma 2, r-1 (p*)
are increasing in U, so that dp*/dc as given in Theorem 5 may not 
always be l ess than dp*/dc as given in Theorem 3. 
The specul ations of Remark 8 can be made more rigorous by 
considering formal ly the effects of increases in U.  
Theorem 6 :  Given Assumptions 1-6 and 8,  dr( x) /dU = O. 
for all p• L 0, 
In addition, 
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� = Pfll•{G[a(p ) ]  - G[a(p• ) ]} dF(p ) / ( l  - p)B'(p*)F(p*) > o. ( 54)
0 
Proof: Differentiating (49) , 
.2R.! = [B'(p*)F(p* ) ]-l JP* [.fil!!.i!l - filil.n..!l]dF(p)dU 0 au au • 
For p � Pc' equation (44) gives
.fil!!.J!l = pG[a(p) J/ Cl  - p) .au 
( 55)  
But a'(p)  > 0 so (54) is positive .  For p > pc' equation (42) gives
£..!il.pl = pG[r-1(p  ) J/ (l  - p) .au c 
But r-1 (p  ) is independent of p soc 
.2.!il.Pl - � = 0au au for p• L p > Pc ·
Hence ( 54) holds for al l p• . Q. E.D. 
Remark 9: The greater is the value of no-repurchase , the l ess  the 
consumer searches before making an initial purchase . Thus, on 
average , the initial purchase wil l  be made at a higher price . If p• 
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is st ill less than pc after the increase in U, the latter effect can
never induce the consumer to renew search once the taste parameter is 
known, it only impl ies that no-repurchase wil l  dominate repurchase at 
the initial price more often. However, if p* exceeds pc after the
increase in U, renewed search becomes a viable option in some case s. 
No-repurchase wil l  be optimal more often (always ) ,  but now renewed 
search wil l dominate continued repurchase at the initial price for 
some prices and some tast e parameters. Thus post-initial purchase 
search may or may not increase, on average (as  viewed ex ante) with 
increases in U. The l ikel ihood of continued repurchase at the initial 
price  will always decrease though. 
S .  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
For the general model of consumer behavior with respect to 
innovative goods, as developed in Section 4 of this paper, an optimal 
search and consumption policy is characterized by two scalars, p* and 
Pc' and by two functions, r(x) and a(p ) ,  such that in the pre-initial
purchase phase, 
p � p* => buy the good at price p and observe x; and 
p > p* => search again, 
and in the post-initial purchase phase, if Po is the price of the 
initially purchased good, then 
{ cease consumption altogether if x < aCp0) ,  or 
Po � Pc =>
consume the initially purchased good forever if x 2 a(p0) ,
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and 
. . -1 -1 
{ cease consumpt ion altogether if x < r-1 Cpc) ,
Po > Pc => renew search for a lower price 1f r (pc ) ix i r Cp0) ,  or 
consume the initially purchased good forever if r-1 (p0) < x.
This pol icy was e stablished under fairly weak assumpt ions, the 
strongest being that V > O. This assumption, however, seems to be:r.p 
the natural way to introduce a taste parameter into the indirect 
util ity function since it is equivalent, under the other assumptions 
of the model, to dr(x) /dx > 0 ( see  Lemma 1) , where r(x)  is the 
reservation price for a standard sequential search probl em when the 
taste parameter is known to be x. Hence when V > 0, an increase in px 
the value of the taste parameter induces the consumer to search less 
intensely for low prices if his or her tastes were known with 
certainty. If Vpx were assumed to be negative, then the proof of
Lemma 1 ,  in particular equation (12) , would imply that dr(x) /dx < 0 � 
the consumer would set a lower reservation price and search more 
intensely as his or her intensity of preference increased, as measured 
by increases in x. This is a peculiar situation, however, since the 
good in que stion is homogeneous � qual ity is not an issue in this 
paper. 
On the other hand, casual introspection might cause one to 
argue that an increase in the consumer's intensity of preference 
should l ead to � search, not less, but this argument is based on 
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the presumption that qual ity varies � to the extent that most 
consumers search more intensely for goods they desire more intensely, 
it is l ikely to be because their concern for qual ity increases as 
their intensity of preference increases ,  not because they become more 
concerned about price. In fact, price is unl ikely to be a maj or issue 
for a consumer who desires some good intensely � such a consumer 
would be willing to pay whatever is necessary (within some appropriate 
bounds� i. e. , up to r (x ) )  to get the good as long as it meets some 
minimum qual ity standard. The latter, however, is not an issue in 
this model. 
This paper has explored the basic structure of the optimal 
search and consumption strategy for innovative goods. In addition, 
two further questions were addressed:  ( 1) how do the various 
parameters, in particular c and U, effect the "critical" prices which 
characterize the consumer's optimal search and consumption pol icy, and 
(2) how do these parameters effect the trade-off between pre-initial 
purchase search and post-initial purchase se arch behavior? 
Regarding question (1) and po st-initial purchase behavior, an 
increase in search costs  wil l  increase r-1 Cp  ) and decrease r-1 Cp)c 
(the l atter for all p 2 0) . Hence for any given initial purchase
price,  P0, the expected amount of post-initial purchase search wil l
remain at z ero ( if Po � pc ) or fal l ( if Po > pc ) .  Increases in the 
util ity of no consumption wil l  increase a(p)  and r-1 Cp  ) but have noc 
effect on r-1 Cp0) .  Hence when the util ity of no consumpt ion
increases, the consumer is more l ikely to forego consumption 
altogether after observing his or her tastes ,  either by repurchasing 
the initially consumed good less  often ( if Po � pc ) or by renewing 
se arch less often ( if Po > pc ) .
The effect s  of increases in c and U on pre-initial purchase 
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behavior are l ess  straightforward. Whil e p* i s  always increasing in U 
-- a ri se in the util ity of foregoing consumption altogether will 
induce less pre-initial purhcase search ( on average) ,  an increase in c 
has ambiguous effects � in particular, an increase in search costs 
can l ead to more pre-initial purchase search ( on average) .  
Regarding quest ion (2) , one must consider the combined effects 
of changes in c and U on pre- and post-initial purchase behavior. For 
exampl e ,  when U increase s,  p* wil l  rise , implying l es s  pre- initial 
purchase search. For any given initial purchase price, p0 , post-
initial purchase search wil l fal l as well. But now higher values of 
Po are possible. As Po increases ,  a(p0) wil l increase as wil l
r-1 CP0) .  The former has no effect on post-initial purchase search but
the latter impl ies that the higher initial purchase prices wil l  be 
associated with more post-initial purchase search. Whether the 
average amount of post-initial purchase search increases when U 
increases i s  thus unknown. However, since pre- initial purchase search 
always falls ,  one could predict with some confidence that the rel ative 
distribution of search effort will  shift toward post-initial purchase 
search as the util ity of foregoing consumption altogether increase s .  
Increase s in se arch costs have even more ambiguous effects on 
the rel ative distribution of search effort than increases in the 
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util ity of nonconsumption. In particular, as c increases ,  p* might 
rise or fal l .  For any given initial purchase price, p0 , r
-1(pc ) wil l
rise and r-1 Cp0) wil l fall as c increases .  Thus post- initial purchase
search wil l decrease on average for any given Po ( or stay constant at 
zero when Po < pc) .  If p* rise s (the standard case ) , then pre-initial
search will on average fal l .  But , again, this means that initial 
purchase prices on average rise . Since r-1 (p0) is increasing in p,
the l atter effect implies more post-initial price search. Thus if an 
increase in search cost s reduces pre-initial purchase se arch, it will  
al so have ambiguous effects on post-initial purchase search. 
If p* falls  when c rise s ,  then the expected amount of pre-
initial purchase search will increa·se, r-1 (p0) wil l on average fall
since Po wil l on average fall,  and the direct effect of the increase 
in c on post-initial purchase search; which is to decrease it, wil l be 
reinforced. Thus if an increase in search costs increases pre-initial 
purchase search, it wil l  also decrease post-initial purchase se arch 
and cause an unambiguous shift from the l atter to the former. 
Since "new" products ,  in general , fall into the class of 
innovative goods , one might well be interested in strategies that 
would induce consumers to at l east "try" the new product as this i s  
prerequisite to  e stabl ishing a "loyal" set  of  consumers .  To  the 
extent that word-of-mouth information flows increase sal es, such 
strategies become espe cially crucial . At the same time, it would be 
of little use to get consumers to try a new product once if most of 
them only discover that they don ' t  l ike it; not only wil l "repeat" 
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sal es be lost , but other consumers may be induced to never even try 
the product , despite the fact that tastes may be heterogeneous . Only 
slightly less desirable ( from the firm' s point of view) is a situation 
in which the consumer tries a given firm' s product ,  dec ides to 
continue consumption, but fail s to repeat purchase in favor of 
renewing search for a lower price . 
Inducing initial purchase s is to some extent out of the 
control of an individual firm; although advertising that shifts G(x) 
outward or decreases the consumer ' s  perception of U might be of use in 
this regard. Given that Z 2 U/( l  - � ) , so that the consumer is 
wil ling to "try" the good, the only strategy which can increase the 
likel ihood that a consumer tries a given firm ' s  product , is to lower 
price . Situations which lead to repeat purchases are characterized by 
-1 P0 � Pc and x 2 a(p0) ,  or Po > Pc and x > r (p0) ,  where Po is the
initial purchase price . At the l evel of general ity of this model,  it 
is hard to predict the effects of changes  in F or G on these 
parameters. The only variabl es, besides �. which can be analyzed are 
c and U. Lowering search costs ,  say by "educating" consumers about 
the properties of the good generally ( i. e . ,  providing information 
which informs the consumers about all firm ' s  goods ) wil l have no 
effect if Po � pc but will  decrease the l ikelihood of a repeat
purchase if Po > Pc · This strategy seems unwise . Lowering U by 
convincing the consumer that "subst itutes" are inadequate,  etc . ,  wil l 
have no effect if Po > pc but will  increase repeat purchase s when
Po � Pc · This seems helpful , but a fall in U wil l al so decrease p*,
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so that this strategy can hurt high-priced finns.  
Of course these conclusions are all  based on a model of 
homogeneous goods . "Qual ity" is no l ess  important for innovative 
goods than noninnovative goods . Moreover, qual ity could be of the 
"search" variety or the "e:i:perience" variety (Wilde, 1980) . 
Introducing quality to the model developed in this paper is clearly an 
important extension. Other extensions are somewhat more pedestrian. 
Introducing durabil ity (goods with lifetimes longer than one period) 
is an example .  Once goods last for more than a singl e period, a 
number of issues arise . For example,  one could allow for the 
existence of se condary markets (Hey and McKenna , 1981) or analyze the 
effects of changes  in durabil ity on the optimal search and consumption 
strategy (Wilde, 1980, Section 5 ) .  Finally, the model might have 
interesting appl ications to the l abor market since a significant 
amount of "job-shopp ing• might well be an attempt by workers to find a 
j ob they "like. "  
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  Copeland def ined convenience goods as "those customarily 
purchased at easily accessible stores , "  shopping goods as "those 
for which the consumer desires to compare prices .  qual ity and 
style at the time of purchase , "  and specialty goods as "those 
which have some particular attraction for the consumer, other 
than price, which induces him to put forth special effort to 
visit the store in which they are sold, and to make the purchase 
without shopping. "  Whil e Copeland ' s  analysis  is remarkably 
sophisticated for its time (50 years ago ! ) ,  it ' s  maj or weakne ss 
is that it taxonomizes goods primarily on the basis of consumer 
behavior (whether or not shopping takes place ) . Modern 
approaches deduce consumer behavior from more basic informational 
properties of goods . 
2 .  "New" goods generally fall within some existing product clas s .  
Consumers might have some famil iarity with the class but won' t 
necessarily know their tastes with respect to the new good since 
by definition it must have some unique features.  The more 
famil iar a consumer is with a product class,  the l ess  uncertain 
he or she is l ikely to be with respect to the potential util ity 
associated with any new good introduced t o  that class ( se e  
Hirschman, 1980 , p. 288) . 
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3 .  "New" goods ( i . e  • •  innovations with a well-defined, exist ing 
product class) are often introduced  initially by a single firm. 
However, different retail outlets may st ill charge different 
prices for the good so the assumption of homogeneity is not 
unreasonabl e .  In the case where the model represents a consumer 
who is unfamil iar with an entire existing product cl ass. the 
assumption of homogeneity is primarily one of convenience � it 
represents a useful first step in the analysis of consumer 
behavior under uncertain tastes .  
4. See Hey and McKenna (1981 )  for a formal analysis of  such a
possibil ity in the context of a search/ experience goods model .
5 .  For "new" goods , as defined in footnote 3 .  Assumption 5 is not 
entirely innocuous . In fact . some authors have propose d  that 
consumer "innovativeness" be defined as "the degree to which an 
individual is rel atively earl ier in adopting an innovation than 
other members of his social system , "  ( Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971, 
p.  27) . Economic analysis of the adopt ion of new innovations has 
also focused  on the timing i ssue , generally from the point of 
view of firms ( e . g  • •  Reinganum, 1981 ;  Balcer and Lippman, 1982 ;  
Jensen, 1982 ) .  
6 .  Equation (1) assumes no recal l .  As i s  wel l-known in the se arch 
literature, under the assumpt ions of this model this is 
equival ent to all owing recal l .  Since the consumer is allowed to 
repurchase the initially purchase d good once tastes are known, 
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the latter is the more appropriate assumption with respect to 
search activity. However, as noted, the implicit assumption of 
no recall with respect to se arch activity yields equivalent 
results to recall ,  and it eases the notational burden 
considerably. 
7. Equation (2) ignores any repurchase costs over and above p.  See
Wilde (1980) for an exampl e of their effect on the
search/experience goods model .
8 .  It will b e  implicitly assumed throughout the remainder of the 
paper that Z > U; i. e • •  the consumer actually finds trial 
consumption of the innovative good preferable to no consumption 
of the innovative good. 
9 .  Indifference between repurchase and renewed search is assumed to 
be resolved by repurchase . This choise is arbitrary but 
innocuous . 
10. Timel ess se arch is a l ess  restrictive assumption for search
activity after the taste parameter is known than before  it is
known since the crucial thing from the firm ' s  perspective is
initial adoption of the good. To the extent that repeat
purchase s are important , the distinction between ex ante
discounting and ex post discounting would be captured by letting
c, or possibly even �. be lower for ex post search than ex ante
search.
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11 . Here indifference is between purchase at r(x)  and renewed search 
12 .  
is assumed to  be resolved in  favor of  purchase . again, this 
choice is arbitrary but innocuous - see footnote 9 .  
Note that when p � p ,  then by definition, r-1 Cp)  
B ' (p)  = Jm V (p, x)dG(x) ( O. 
-m 
p 
= -co. Hence 
13 . Once again, indifference is assumed to be resolved in favor of no 
search in (24) - see footnotes 9 and 11 . 
14. Under standard usage , a "reservation price" is defined as the
unique price such that price observations l ess than or equal to
the reservation price terminate se arch whil e price observations
greater than the reservation price result in continued search -
see Wilde (1980 , p. 1270 and footnote 7) and, especially,
Rothschild (1974 , p.  701)  for further discussions of reservation
prices so defined and their importance .
15 . See Wilde (1981 ,  Section IV) and Lippman and McCall ( 1979) for a 
further discussion of this issue in the context of formal 
search/experience goods models .  
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FIGURE 1 
FORM OF r (x) �EN V > 0 
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FIGURE 2 
EFFECTS OF INCREASES IN SEARCH COSTS (p* CONSTANT ON FALLING) . 
HERE (p* , r (x) ) IS THE LOW SEARCH COST OUTCOME AND 
(p* , r (x) ) IS THE HIGH SEARCH COST OUTCOME . 
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FIGURE 3a 
dr-1 (p*) /dc < 0 
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FIBURE 3b 
-1 dr (p*) /dc > 0 
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FIGURE 4 
V (p , x) / (1-$) , W(x) , AND THE DEFINITION OF u(p) 
u(p) I /;if� .... 
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